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sician, psychiatrist, and chaplain 
alike. By eliminating these artifi-
cial conceptual boundaries, all of 
us can help lead medicine, psy-
chiatry and religion to a holistic 
and unified appreciation of life, 
living, and humanity, perhaps the 
greatest mysteries, and ones we 
share equally with our patients. 
In fact, a better appreciation of 
our own unity may prove to be 
the key to comprehensive medical 
care. 
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Even if it be granted that the 
unborn child does not possess life, 
but only potential life-the ab-
surd thesis of Justice Blackmun, 
in Roe v. Wade, January 22, 1973 
-no justification for an abortion 
is established either morally or 
legally. Granted that this unac-
ceptable position did actually 
maintain in reality, it could only 
signify that the actual life of the 
born child would be derived from 
the potential life of the unborn 
child. A potential human being 
would be virtually a human being. 
It would have a vital principle to 
become human. Now the closest 
thing in dignity to any nature is 
found in the principle of that na-
ture. If one destroys the dignity 
of the principle, how does one re-
store the diginity of the nature? 
Among the reasons presented 
for a basis of decision, the Court 
maintained that "the unborn have 
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never been recognized in the law 
as persons in the whole sense." 
But the notion of person can only 
be understood as indivisible. What 
the Court wished to convey is 
that the rights of the unborn have 
not been consistently treated in 
civil and criminal suits. It would 
have been incumbent upon the 
Court, in arriving at so weighty a 
decision, to explore whether the 
unborn child could at least enjoy 
the status of a moral person. But 
this door they dared not open 
because a moral person has the 
right to perpetuate itself. Justice 
Blackmun's elaborate historical, 
legal, and moral maze of fact and 
fancy was designed to leave no 
avenue of escape in this direction. 
A more tenable position is that 
t he human intellectual principle 
establishes the human person. 
This principle is at first only in 
potency to knowledge, both be-
fore birth and immediately after 
birth. Now, how do we establish 
the origin of this principle in 
man? 
Too often, of late, the man of 
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faith is apt to declare apodictical-
ly that this intellectual principle 
is established at conception, when 
an immediate animation takes 
place. 
There are no sound theological 
reasons for accepting such a theo-
ry. First of all, there has never 
been any official ecclesiastical 
document, encyclical, decree or 
canon, which endorses this theory 
because "the soul is not transmit-
ted with the semen as though it 
were begotten by coitus."l In 
Pius IX's definition of the Im-
I 
maculate Conception, there is the 
affirmation of faith that "in the 
very first instant of her concep-
tion she was preserved from all 
stain of original sin." Original sin 
is transmitted throughout the 
union of seminal principles, which 
are ordered to the development, 
organization and growth of the 
body. This human body becomes 
a human being with the infusion 
of the soul, the creative act of 
God. The seminal principles nei-
ther virtually nor potentially con-
tain the souJ.2 But the body is in 
potency to receive the soul. To a 
Thomist, this reception takes 
place when the body is developed 
to the point of being a fitting sub-
ject of the intellectual soul. If one 
maintains that the soul is present 
at the moment of conception, then 
he must justify how this one cell 
is a human being. DNA does not 
suffice to constitute a total hu-
man being. But "nature is want-
ing in nothing that is necessary 
for the fulfillment of its proper 
operation."3 This cell, whose ac-
tivity is immediately directed to 
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the embryonic order, does not 
have any intrinsic exigency for 
an intellectual principle. But 
when we witness the configura-
tion of a human being in fetal 
development, and we recognize it 
to be human, then there is the 
exigency for an intellectual prin-
ciple for it to be truly human. 
Traditionally, the only person 
who was actually conceived as a 
person in the womb was Christ. 
An immediate animation theo-
ry arise as a simple solution to 
the problem that abortion is not 
permitted even from the moment 
of conception. But to say that the 
soul should be considered as pres-
ent at the moment of conception 
is not a declaration that the soul 
is actually present. It is another 
way of saying that the newly 
formed cell possesses a right to 
survival in virtue of its dignity as 
a principle in human generation, 
which is terminated with the in-
fusion of the intellectual soul. It 
is indeed a moral person. But to 
declare it a natural human per-
son, a man, is not as convincing 
as the theory of an Aristotle or a 
Thomas, who never lost sight of 
common sense in their quest for 
wisdom. 
Professor John T. Noonan, Jr. 
makes an overt case for immedi-
ate ensoulment at the moment of 
conception, with arguments which 
do not solve anything. "If a mo-
ment had to be chosen for ensoul-
ment, no convincing argument 
now appeared to support Aristotle 
or to put ensoulment at a later 
stage of fetal life."4 To quote an-
other view of Noonan that lends 
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itself to instant animation, "A be-
ing with a human genetic code is 
man." .' A genetic code is a bio-
logical fact, an hereditary factor. 
While it is true to say that the 
matrix of the adult's personality 
is genetically present at the mo-
ment of conception, this cannot 
be accepted in a deterministic 
sense. This only refers to man's 
bodily dispositions. The human 
person is at once organic and 
transorganic, with a destiny which 
is temporal and eternal. The de-
termining principles of man's per-
sonality are nongenetic, his intel-
lect and will. Although intimately 
influenced by genetic qualities, 
the will is not determined by 
them and "the intellectual soul 
does not operate through any 
bodily organ."6 
To Thomas, the person cannot 
be defined in terms of the body 
alone, or the soul alone, but they 
are both inextricably associated 
with the notion of the human per-
son; and human nature is gen-
erated at the moment of ensoul-
ment. (That is why he does not 
allow the separated soul to be 
called a person; and he advances 
the exigency of the final resurrec-
tion of the body so that the sepa-
rated soul will be reunited to the 
body to become a person in eter-
nity.) Man, standing on the hori-
zon of eternity, is not only 
dignified through his soul, but his 
body also possess a dignity as the 
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noblest matter in all creation, 
from the moment of conception, 
in virtue of its potency to receive 
the intellectual soul as its very 
act of existing. This is the founda-
tion of its natural right to sur-
vival. Man is co-creator of man, 
and what is conceived excels in 
nature many legal creations of 
society, moral persons, and it de-
serves the same title at least. 
By way of a postscript, it should 
be noted that the position of the 
Angelic Doctor with respect to 
the time of ensoulment (a mat-
ter of faith and the precise mo-
ment of which reason cannot place 
with certitude), has been unduly 
prejudiced because of his errol' 
on the Immaculate Conception. 
Thomas taught that Mary was 
immaculate from the moment of 
ensoulment, and not from the mo-
ment of conception. The doctrine 
of the Immaculate Conception 
recognizes the distinction between 
conception and ensoulment, and 
declares that it was from the mo-
ment of conception that Mary 
was immaculate. 
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